Assymmetric Leadership in Confronted Parties (Job Market Paper).

Primaries and Campaign Financing.

Shaking Hands Brings Knives Closer. (work in progress)

When the structure of a party is designed, the decision over the number of people that have to rule it is crucial. The larger the set of this people the better chance to have leaders who are ideologically close to citizens. However, more leaders in a party also bring higher costs for the institutions. These two effects reflect the existence of an optimal number. This paper focuses on the features of the citizen’s distribution of ideal policies that may alter that optimal number.

In this paper, I analyze the decisions of political parties on the regulation of their campaign financing. In order to examine this, I construct an election model with primaries, where the right to vote is bought through a contribution. I analyze different contribution systems and if parties can reach a consensus over the common regulation. I explore the usefulness of the caps on contributions as a tool to reach such consensus, as well as its effects on participation.

When the structure of a party is designed, the decision over the number of people that have to rule it is crucial. The larger the set of this people the better chance to have leaders who are ideologically close to citizens. However, more leaders in a party also bring higher costs for the institutions. These two effects reflect the existence of an optimal number. This paper focuses on the features of the citizen’s distribution of ideal policies that may alter that optimal number.