Game Theory

David Pérez-Castrillo (Fall 2006)

<u>Program</u>

1. Introduction.

2. Complete Information Games in Strategic Form.

- 2.1. Strategic Form Games. Dominated Strategies. Nash Equilibrium. Comments on Pure-Strategy Equilibria, Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto Optimality. Existence of Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium. Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games with Continuous Payoffs.
- 2.2. Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions. Rationalizability. Correlated Equilibrium.

3. Extensive Games with Observed Actions.

- 3.1. Extensive Games with Perfect Information. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Backward Induction. Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions.
- 3.2. The Rubinstein-Stahl Bargaining Model.
- 3.3. Simple Timing Games. The War of Attrition.
- 3.4. Repeated Games. The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games.

4. Games of Incomplete Information.

- 4.1. Incomplete Information. Type and Strategy. Bayesian Equilibrium. Mechanism Design.
- 4.2. Extensive Games of Incomplete Information. Signaling Games. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Sequential Equilibrium. Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium. Proper Equilibrium.

5. Economics of Information.

- 5.1. The Base Model: Symmetric Information
- 5.2. Moral hazard. The Two-Effort Level Case. The Continuous-Effort Level Case. Moral Hazard with Hidden Information. Extensions.

5.3. Adverse Selection. The Two-Type Case. The Continuous-Type Case. When Principals Compete for Agents. Extensions.

Main References:

Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, 1991, Game Theory, MIT Press.

Osborne, M.J. and A. Rubistein, 1994, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press.

Macho-Stadler, I. and D. Pérez-Castrillo, 2001 (2nd Edition), *An Introduction to the Economics of Information*, Oxford UP.

Other good texbooks are:

Binmore, K., 1992, Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory, D.C. Heath.

Mas-Colell, A., M.D. Whinston, and J. Green, 1995, Microeconomic Theory, Ox. UP.

Myerson, R., 1991, Game Theory and Analysis of Conflict, Harvard UP.

Osborne, M.J., 2003, An Introduction to Game Theory, Ox. UP.

P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont, 2005, Contract Theory, MIT Press.

D. Martimort and J.-J.. Laffont, 2001, *The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model*, Princeton UP.

Complete novices can look at a simple an intuitive **introduction**:

Dixit, A and B. Nalebuff, 1991, Thinking Strategically, Norton.