I am currently a PhD candidate in the International Doctorate in Economic Analysis (IDEA) in the Univesitat Autònoma de Barcelona in Spain.   I am participating in this year's job market for academic economists and will be attending the AEA meeting in Chicago, the SAE Simposio in Malaga and the RES Meeting in London for interviews.

My research interests are
Primary: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Organizational Economics
Secondary: Economics of Information, Political Economy, Social Networks, Experimental Economics.

My job market paper is :

"Standing in Line: Demand for investment opportunities with exogenous priorities"

Abstract: We look at a model in which agents can invest in a project with a limited number of available slots. Agents have incomplete information about the project’s expected payoffs. Based on that, they must decide whether to invest in the risky project or take a safe outside option. Slots are assigned following an exogenous priority order. Low priority agents may face a winner's curse: if they choose to invest and obtain a slot in the project it must be that agents with higher priority choose not to do so. In equilibrium, only high priority agents choose to invest when their private information indicates they should. Low priority agents take the outside option independently of their private information. This feature of equilibrium is maintained when we look at variations of the model with priorities assigned by lottery or determined by a Bernoulli process. We perform relevant comparative statics and compare equilibrium outcomes of our simultaneous action model with the ones from a social learning model. Our analysis highlights unexplored links between market design features and the performance of such markets. In particular, agents' knowledge of the priority order affects both demand and efficiency. Furthermore, herding behavior occurs even in the absence of social learning.

 

The following is another completed paper of mine:

"Seeing is beleiving: an experiment on strategic thinking"