

TOMMASO MAJER

International Doctorate in Economic Analysis
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PERSONAL DATA

Birth date and place: 2 July 1981, Venice (VE), Italy
Citizenship: Italian
Civil status: single

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics
Telecommunications, Regulation

EDUCATION

2005 - present	PhD student at the International Doctorate in Economic Analysis (IDEA), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain Advisor: Xavier Martínez-Giralt Expected Completion: June 2010
2005 - 2007	M.Phil. in economics. (IDEA), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain.
2003 - 2005	MA in economics (final grade: 110/110 with honours). Università Ca' Foscari, Venice, Italy.
2004 - 2005	Erasmus student at the Universitat d'Alacant, Spain.
2000 - 2003	BA in economics (final grade: 110/110 with honours). Università Ca' Foscari, Venice, Italy.

VISITING POSITIONS

Apr - Jul 2009	Imperial College of London, United Kingdom. Visiting PhD student.
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TEACHING EXPERIENCES

2008 - 2009	Institut de Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), Master en Relaciones Internacionales (graduate) TA: International Economy for Non Economist.
2009 - 2010	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) Lecturer: Mathematics for Economists I (3 groups).
2008 - 2009	TA: Econometrics I (3 groups), Econometric Models.
2007 - 2008	TA: Microeconomics II (3 groups), Advanced Microeconomics.
2006 - 2007	TA: Macroeconomics I, Macroeconomics II, Macroeconomic Theory.

OTHER ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES

2008 - 2009	Student ENTER workshops coordinator
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SEMINARS

- 2009 – Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (CMT), Barcelona, Spain.
 – TSE Brown Bag Seminar, Toulouse University, France.
 – Microeconomics workshop at Universidad Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain.
- 2008 – Microeconomics workshop at Universidad Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain.

CONFERENCES AND SUMMER SCHOOLS

- 2009 – XXXIV Simposio de Analysis Economico, University of Valencia, Spain.
 – ASSET, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey.
 – XXIV Jornadas de Economía Industrial, University of Vigo, Spain.
 – Second Dolomites Summer School on antitrust for networks:
 focus on vertical restraints, Alba di Canazei, Italy.
 – ENTER Jamboree, University College of London, UK.

FELLOWSHIPS

- 2006 - 2009 Predoctoral fellowship (FPU),
 awarded by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science.
- 2005 - 2006 Predoctoral fellowship, awarded by the UAB, Spain.
- 2000 - 2005 Fellowship awarded by Università Ca' Foscari.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Referee for: Economics Bulletin.

WORK EXPERIENCES

Apr - Jul 2003 Internship, "Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Venezia".

LANGUAGES

Italian (mother tongue), English, Spanish, Catalan, French (good), German (basic).

REFERENCES

Xavier Martínez Giralt

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JOB MARKET PAPER

Bilateral monopoly in telecommunications: bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates

Abstract: It is broadly accepted that mobile network operators are monopolists when they set the termination rate for the calls made to their own network. Since the mobile-to-fixed termination rates are usually regulated at cost and the fixed network operator has the obligation to terminate the incoming calls, therefore the fixed provider can neither threaten to raise the mobile-to-fixed termination charge, nor to refuse to terminate the call. Hence, mobile network operators can fix high fixed-to-mobile termination rates. We propose a policy to overcome this termination bottleneck imposing reciprocity between the mobile-to-fixed and fixed-to-mobile termination rates and relaxing the interconnection obligation. First, we consider a benchmark where mobile-to-fixed termination rates are regulated at cost and fixed and mobile network operators negotiate the fixed-to-mobile termination rate. We show that fixed-to-mobile termination rates depend negatively on the mobile-to-mobile termination rate and positively on the intensity of competition in the mobile sector. Moreover, imposing reciprocity on termination rates total welfare increases with respect to the benchmark.

Does the waterbed effect ham consumer?

Abstract: We analyze how an increase of the efficiency triggers the exercise of buyer power and how this lowers the price of the input good for the efficient firm and raises the rival's input price (the so-called waterbed effect). We consider an industry with a supplier that sells an intermediate good to two downstream firms. Differently from the common assumption that the supplier makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to the retailers, we consider that the parties bargain over the price of the input good. Moreover, downstream firms compete in the final consumption market. We find that the waterbed effect is an industry wide effect and we characterize the conditions under which it occurs. Finally, we consider the welfare consequences. We show that when downstream firms compete à la Cournot an increase of efficiency of one firm may reduce consumers' surplus through the waterbed effect. Instead, when firms compete à la Hotelling, the increase of efficiency increases consumers' surplus.

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