Markus Kinateder

Universidad de Navarra (Spain)

My Research Interests are Microeconomics, Game Theory and Network Economics.

PLEASE NOTE, THAT MY RESEARCH WILL NOT BE UPDATED ANY MORE ON THIS SITE,

but only on my new webpage at the University of Navarre. You should be able to find it (soon) by

clicking on my name on the list of professors of the Department of Economics.

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WP 674.06 Dept. Econ. UAB (this version: June 2008; first version: 23 Oct. 2006)

Abstract: Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted

game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected

network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but com-

municate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the

network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of

discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the cor-

responding payoff set are reduced under certain conditions. A general class

of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of

the payoff space. A network result obtains; namely, the level of cooperation

in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its clustering

coefficient as in other models. This model applies in more general situations

(without network) in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information

generation and the players’ reaction to it.

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Team Formation in a Network (first final version: June 2008)

Abstract: Two project leaders in a network, which captures social relations,

recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each

team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality which is a ran-

dom variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding

project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the

involved agents. A pure strategy Sequential Equilibrium exists under weak con-

ditions. An agent’s payoff is related to his position in the network, though no

measure in the literature captures this relation. Hence, a way to categorize

players is proposed. Due to the network’s geography inefficient unemployment

may arise in equilibrium.

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Abstract: An infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a con-

nected, undirected and fixed network is studied. Players observe their immediate

neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history

throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the

players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a

complete network. In special cases, the network need not be connected. The re-

duction in the set of payoff vectors supportable by sequential equilibria, which is

due to the network, is illustrated analytically and graphically for three players in

a star versus a complete network. The set of sequential equilibria under strategic

communication intersects with that under exogenously imposed truthtelling,

though each is not a subset of the other for some range of discount factors.