« Accord Climatique: Concession et Ratification »,  Forthcoming in Revue Economique, with T. Tazdaït 

« Formation et Développement des Accords Environnementaux : Les Effets de Leadership », Négociation, 2(2007) 121-137, with T. Tazdaït.

 « Games of Influence in Climate Change Negotiations : Modelling Interactions, », Ecological Modelling, 204 (2007) 301-314, with T.Tazdaït. 

 « The Status of Integrated Assessment in Climatic Policy Making: An Overview of Inconsistencies Underlying Response Functions », Environmental Science and Policy, 7 (2004) 69-75. 

 « Les Impacts du Changement Climatique : la Part de l’Arbitraire », Natures, Sciences, Sociétés, 4 (2004), with P. Ambrosi. 

 «  An Evolutionay Approach to Global Change Negotiations / Une Approche Evolutionniste des Négociations Internationales dans le Cadre du Changement Climatique », Louvain Economics Review,70 (1) (2004),  with J.C. Péreau and T.Tazdaït.

« Multigas Emissions Coefficient in the JOBS model », OECD ENV/EPOC/GSP 04/02 (2002)

« Socio-economics of policy formation and choices » in « European Leadership of Climate Change and Sustainability Regimes », Grubb M. and Gupta J. ed. Kluwer, Netherlands (2000), in collaboration with J.C. Hourcade and T. Lepesant.
 

  Papers submitted or under revision
 

« What Environmental Treaty with Whom »,  Revision in Ecological Economics

« North-South Policy and Sizing-up the Climate Treaty: Should we Wait and See ?», submitted

« Explicit Communication and the Weight of Rhetoric: A Stochastic Approximation of Bargaining Outcomes», submitted
 

  Work in progress

-      Multigas Assessment in a CGE framework

Abstract: Multi-gas emission assessment in integrated assessment models is still at his infancy. Very few models provide sectorial and regional disaggregated picture of multi-gas emissions over time. Recent research devotes increasingly to provide emission inventories. Emission sources and economic drivers are also getting better understood. Multi-gas emission module will likely flourish in most integrated assessment models in the coming years. This paper provides a description of the building of such module in the JOBS Computable General Equilibrium Model.  The building of  emission benchmarks for CO2, HFC, PFC, SF6, SO2, NOX and NMVOC is described. Method and assumptions to derive an emission baseline are explained. Preliminary results are presented under the form of a brief economic and environmental outlook.

-      Global environmental negotiations: the role played by international institutions.

Short Abstract: The underlying idea of this contribution is to use correlation as a mean to capture the role played by the President of the Conference of the Parties within climate change negotiations.  I show that by suggesting an agreement proposal to each partie of the negotiation, the President can increase social welfare.

-       Dynamic Simulation of Global Change Negotiation: Representing the Role Played by International Institution

Short Abstract: This paper is in the same veine than the previous contribution. The idea is to propose an application of the concept by presenting a dynamic simulation of the climate change negotiation evaluating both subgame perfect and tree correlated equilibria. I use the Nordhaus and Boyer RICE model to evaluate all possible payoffs. 

-       Les négociations globales d'environnement: nature du jeu et concepts d'équilibre

Short Abstract:  This contribution is mostly methodological. I present the nature of the climate change game (static vs dynamic, simultaneous vs sequential, information structure) and discuss equilibria concepts. 

-      The Socio-Economics of Alien Species

Short Abstract: Part of the EU-FP6 ALARM project, this first contribution aims at studying what economics can say about managing alien species invasion. The overall objective of the contribution is to define a taxinomie of Alien Species in order to review which economics tools could be the most adequate. In particular, we focus on how useful could be cost-benefit, cost-efficiency and multicriteria approaches. 

-      Mediation, Arbitration, Adjudication and the provision of public goods

Short Abstract: I study the provision of public goods when agents write binding agreements. A simple model is considered where unicity of the Nash Equilibrium is proved to always exist under non restrictive assumptions. The outcome is socially inefficent, no provision should be made. To solve this inefficiency, I focus on the implementation by a third party of three distinct coordination tools : mediation, arbitration and adjudication. To this end, I define those coordination tools and present a method to analyze them in our public economics setting. I characterize the equilibrium structure when implementing each of those coordination tool. Only in some cases does the equilibrium improves upon, resulting in more efficient provision of the public good. In other cases, the third party proves to be useless.